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The European Forum was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 1992 with 
the mission of bringing together at the Institute for a given academic year a 
group of experts, under the supervision of annual scientific director(s), for 
researching a specific topic primarily of a comparative and interdisciplinary 
nature. 
 
This Working Paper has been written in the context of the 2000-2001 European 
Forum programme on “Between Europe and the Nation State: the Reshaping of 
Interests, Identities and Political Representation” directed by Professors Stefano 
Bartolini (EUI, SPS Department), Thomas Risse (EUI, RSC/SPS Joint Chair) 
and Bo Stråth (EUI, RSC/HEC Joint Chair). 
 
The Forum reflects on the domestic impact of European integration, studying 
the extent to which Europeanisation shapes the adaptation patterns, power 
redistribution, and shifting loyalties at the national level. The categories of 
‘interest’ and ‘identity’ are at the core of the programme and a particular 
emphasis is given to the formation of new social identities, the redefinition of 
corporate interests, and the domestic changes in the forms of political 
representation. 
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INTRODUCTION1 
 
In the contemporary European Union (EU), the European Parliament includes a 
Belgian citizen representing an Italian constituency and an Italian citizen 
representing a Belgian constituency. A national court’s reference to the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) allowed a British citizen to circumvent 
nationality requirements and become a student teacher in Germany. Ongoing 
legal challenges opened the vast majority of public sector employment to 
Europeans on the basis of their qualifications rather than their nationality. Even 
the citizens of countries only associated with the EU successfully invoke ECJ 
legal interpretation; Algerians and Moroccans have been convincing the highest 
French courts to grant supplemental pension benefits that the national 
administration refused to “export” to non-residents. Yet against all this 
transnational activity, less than two percent of Europeans reside outside their 
home country within the EU, and an even smaller fraction work in another EU 
Member State. Both EU institutions and national courts respect states’ rights to 
restrict “sensitive” public service posts, including positions in prisons and the 
military, to their own nationals. And, EU Member States unanimously agreed to 
limit a long list of social welfare benefits to residents within their territories, 
with the approval of the European Court of Justice.  
 
Such discrepancies suggest that shifts toward a more European basis for 
belonging coexist with enduring commitments to national and territorially 
bounded communities. Indeed, formal advances toward a supranational 
community of Europeans have persistently coincided with efforts to preserve 
national distinctions and resist EU encroachments. Over the course of nearly 
fifty years of regional integration, a striking range of economic, social, and 
political rights have developed to accommodate transnational interactions 
among individuals. Many of these rights are most commonly associated with 
national citizenship in liberal democratic states. The explicit declaration of 
European citizenship itself appeared in 1992. What is equally striking, however, 
are gaps in the content of European rights, official practices that diverge 
significantly from formal legal obligations, and the limited extent to which 
individuals try to exercise those rights that transgress traditional boundaries 
between national societies.      
 
This paper examines the interactions that produce foundations for a 
supranational form of belonging, yet simultaneously preserve the national 
character of societies within the EU. National governing elites, migrants, and 
EU institutions have been creating the basis for the emergence of a European 
society. But the struggles between these actors, and the responses of broader 
publics, reflect that the process of reconstructing boundaries and belonging 
remains contested. Patterns of conflict and cooperation indicate that 
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identification with Europe and commitments to achieve a genuine community of 
Europeans are shallow.    
 
National governments initially pursued regional integration in order to 
promote peace and prosperity on a continent plagued by devastating wars. For 
the original Member States, the Second World War discredited purely national 
solutions to European problems and made national preservation appear 
dependent upon cooperation. Joint control over coal and steel resources, along 
with market integration, were means to link (West) German interests to western 
Europe and encourage economic growth and modernization. The exchange and 
regulation of industrial and agricultural goods dominated the early integration 
agenda. Visions of European nation-building were largely absent, and 
arrangements to enable labor migration were a mere side-show that owed their 
existence to the anticipation of labor shortages.  
 
The European legal provisions Member States adopted to facilitate labor 
migration did resonate with a small minority of individuals, who migrated 
across borders to take advantage of economic opportunities outside their home 
state. Migrants’ experience in their new host states revealed major problems 
with the implementation and interpretation of their European rights. 
Supranational institutions then served as allies in migrants’ efforts to enforce 
their rights against states. Member States had endowed supranational 
institutions with enforcement mechanisms in order to protect themselves from 
the negative consequences of other states’ cheating. Supranational institutions 
used these enforcement mechanisms to act on their mandates to promote the 
European interest, and to expand their own institutional competencies. The 
European Commission, which oversees the administration of European law and 
prosecutes violations of it before the ECJ, can use its control over infringement 
proceedings as a source of pressure to shift the meaning and scope of European 
provisions. The ECJ, which resolves EU legal disputes, used its authority as the 
ultimate interpreter of European law to create a system of enforcement that 
protects individuals from the negative consequences of states’ cheating. In this 
system of legal recourse, individuals realize their European rights before 
national courts. National courts refer disputes about European law to the ECJ, 
which interprets the relevant EU provision in a preliminary ruling. The national 
court then uses the ECJ’s interpretation to decide the case. This multi-level 
system results in the enforcement of European law by national courts against 
national administrations.2  
 
The legal struggle between migrants and Member States offers the ECJ 
the opportunity to expand a European foundation for belonging. Broad judicial 
interpretation of narrow provisions on labor mobility has created rights that 
Member States never intended to honor, and it has extended these rights to 
populations of beneficiaries that national governments certainly intended to 
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exclude. Some of the most controversial ECJ case law involves the extension of 
legal rights beyond citizens of EU Member States to the resident third country 
nationals of particular states formally associated with the EU: Algeria, 
Morocco, Turkey, and Tunisia. Yet even as the ECJ builds a set of European 
rights, it also respects the primacy of national loyalties in some instances. 
Limited by the parameters of Member State agreements, the ECJ maximizes 
opportunities for interaction among Europeans but stops short of any effort to 
challenge forms of exclusion that are linked to core national commitments.  
 
Those ECJ rulings that expand European legal entitlements can involve 
political and financial liabilities for multiple Member States. Responses to these 
unanticipated developments, however, cannot be explained simply in terms of 
cost-benefit calculations. National governments have resisted some European 
rights that bore few costs, but challenged traditional notions of belonging. A 
recurring tendency to emphasize residence in the provision of social welfare 
benefits prioritizes territorial communities over those linked by national 
citizenship, without any necessary cost advantages. And, despite parallel 
financial burdens related to social welfare benefits for EU nationals and 
associated third country nationals, resistance to new entitlements has been 
strongest in the case of associated third country nationals, who remain largely 
unrecognized as members of a community of "Europeans."  
 
Official resistance to migrants’ claims suggests that national governments 
remain firmly committed to national communities. Loath to disobey the ECJ 
flagrantly, national governments usually resist legal obligations indirectly. 
National administrations obey individual judgments while they refrain from 
altering their practices. Such evasion can persist for long periods in the absence 
of sustained legal pressures.3  The European Commission’s prosecution 
constitutes one possible source of such pressure. The other includes relentless 
litigation before national courts, which increases the costs of evasion and may 
convince administrations to come into conformity to avoid constant legal 
challenge.  
 
That neither source of sustained legal pressure is readily available reflects 
further gaps in the commitment to a supranational community of Europeans. 
The European Commission does not have sufficient resources to investigate 
evasive practices exhaustively. As a result, it must rely on private complaints to 
identify possible infractions, and it must choose among the battles it wishes to 
fight. Relative to larger issues of European competitiveness and the interests of 
large firms, migrants rarely make the cut. Many officials dealing with social 
issues within the European Commission may be genuinely committed to the 
rights of individual Europeans. Yet, most collective efforts by the European 
Commission to ameliorate the situation of migrants seem to be responses to a 
distinct lack of popular enthusiasm for European integration, and the prospect 
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that future cooperation might fail to win domestic ratification as a result. The 
first significant efforts to publicize migrant rights followed the ratification 
crises of the 1992 Treaty on European Union.4  The European Commission’s 
recent report on the need for a European system of legal aid for cross-border 
disputes followed the identification of endemic problems associated with 
individual access to European rights in a large-scale survey, pursued in the 
context of the negotiation and ratification of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty.5   
 
The plight of migrants before national courts further points to a 
fundamental lack of identification with other Europeans within civil society 
itself. Migrants face many obstacles to litigation. Insufficient knowledge about 
European rights, the limited number of lawyers specialized in the legal concerns 
of migrants, the lack of class actions and legal aid in the European legal system, 
and the sheer financial costs associated with litigation all prevent migrants from 
independently generating meaningful legal pressures. Organizational support 
could help migrants overcome many of the burdens associated with litigation. 
Organizational resources facilitate awareness, the coordination of promising 
claims, and forum-shopping for the national judges most receptive to an 
expansive interpretation of European legal rights. However, the national 
orientation of most labor and citizen organizations is typically unsympathetic to 
the situation of migrants. Migrant organizations themselves tend to represent 
particular ex-patriot ethnic communities and rarely are transnational in 
membership.  Small networks of legal professionals demonstrate their 
commitment to a supranational conception of belonging by pursuing migrants’ 
rights before national courts and the ECJ. However, even these few individuals 
and organizations that help migrants appear to be primarily committed to 
universal rights, rather than regionally contingent forms of belonging. Most 
who aid migrants assist individuals facing discriminatory treatment within their 
community, regardless of whether they are of “EU” origin or not. These patterns 
of civic organization, along with persistently low levels of intra-EU migration, 
indicate that national societies remain uninspired by the prospect for a 
supranational community of Europeans. 
 
Finally, on some occasions where legal pressures effectively challenged 
quiet forms of evasion, national governments engaged in more active forms of 
resistance to maintain traditional social boundaries. Member States acted 
unanimously to overrule a line of ECJ case law in order to limit payment of 
particular social security benefits to residents within their borders. In response 
to the accretion of rights for associated third country nationals, Member States 
preempted the ECJ’s ability to extend these rights to new populations by 
collectively eliminating all measures that confer individual rights in the newer 
association agreements with states of the former Communist bloc. Germany also 
sought to preempt ECJ interference by abandoning a proposal for a new social 
program that might have been subject to European legal obligations and by 
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carefully constructing the operation of another social program to restrict access 
de facto according to traditional territorial criteria. These responses to the ECJ’s 
efforts to construct a more European basis for belonging demonstrate that 
Member States continue to privilege national and territorial communities over 
any potential European society. 
 
The paper proceeds in three sections: first, I discuss the extent to which 
European law reflects an effort to restructure boundaries and the basis for 
belonging within the EU. Next, I trace how this process has been contested, 
identifying the evasive practices and overt confrontations associated with 
efforts to dismantle traditional boundaries and conceptions of belonging. 
Finally, I evaluate how individuals and civil society have responded to evolving 
legal obligations. The dominant pattern of interaction among these actors 
suggests that any new European foundation for belonging remains thin.  
 
EUROPEAN LAW: THE END OF NATIONALITY AND TERRITORY 
AS A BASIS FOR BELONGING? 
 
European rights that facilitate labor mobility erode the importance of territory 
and nationality as criteria for inclusion in communities that enjoy equal 
treatment with respect to employment, residence, social welfare benefits, and 
taxation. The advent of European citizenship also confers a few supranational 
political rights, creating a polity that transcends national boundaries to a limited 
degree. Yet, in this section I will argue that the historic lack of a broader 
commitment to the development of a transnational European society is evident 
from the gaps and restrictions associated with EU legal provisions. Both 
Member States and the ECJ have refrained from challenging central features of 
national exclusiveness as European rights have evolved. The checkpoints where 
individuals find themselves interrogated about whether they belong have largely 
ceased to be connected to the territorial boundaries between Member States. 
Instead, individuals find their European and national credentials under scrutiny 
well inside national borders when they apply for public sector jobs, social and 
medical assistance, social security benefits, admission to higher education, tax 
exemptions, and the right to vote. At these checkpoints, the markers that 
identify those who belong remain intimately connected to national origin, 
economic status, and the location of permanent residence.       
 
The national citizens of Member States owed their first rights to move 
freely between member countries to the expectation of labor shortages and the 
potential economic benefits of greater labor mobility. As a result, early 
European treaty provisions limited free movement rights to those who worked, 
established businesses, or provided services.6  The first regulation on labor 
rights even limited the authorization to work in another Member State to 
situations involving an insufficient number of national workers.7  This explicit 
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protection disappeared by 1968, leading to the creation of a formally open labor 
market in the private sector.8  In this new regional market, Member State 
nationality served as the core marker of the right to cross borders to participate 
in the economy of another Member State.  
 
Yet an exception for the public service simultaneously restricted 
transnational employment rights.9  The public service exception allowed 
Member States to ensure that their own citizens served the national community 
in fields encompassing communications, culture, education, energy, health care, 
scientific research, and transportation. Migrant challenges to this exclusion 
resulted in over twenty years of litigation about the appropriate definition of 
public service.10  The ECJ’s definition significantly narrowed the public service 
exception, but it nonetheless preserved exclusive access for posts that presume 
“a special relationship of allegiance to the State and reciprocity of rights and 
duties which form the foundation of the bond of nationality.”11  Subsequent ECJ 
case law consistently recognized the importance of national ties in the 
performance of particular occupations. Meanwhile, a stream of ECJ decisions 
denounced nationality requirements for employment in public health care, 
education, and civilian research as well as essentially commercial services 
related to culture, transportation, and public utilities.12  Despite the claims of 
Member States, the ECJ did not consider any of these areas to require a core 
commitment to the state or its national community. The European Commission 
followed the ECJ’s lead. After a series of cases had reinforced a narrow reading 
of the public service exception, the European Commission made a formal 
announcement that this exception to the free movement of workers remained 
justifiable only for high state offices, the judiciary, armed forces, and police and 
tax authorities.13  Together, the ECJ’s definition of public service and European 
Commission’s interpretative guidelines simultaneously expanded migrant 
access to public sector employment and retained exclusive criteria for those 
occupations that demand national loyalty.      
 
Productive economic status, whether in the private or public sector, 
historically served as the key marker signifying the right to reside in another 
Member State. EU provisions did not extend residence rights to those who are 
not active in the economy until 1990, when commitments to abolish frontier 
controls intensified as part of the effort to complete the internal market. And 
national governments limited this right to migrants with sufficient wealth and 
social insurance to provide for their own needs.14  Even the formal realization of 
free movement and residence rights for all Europeans through the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) in 1992 still depends on financial independence in 
practice. EU Member States are not about to welcome any migrant who is 
dependent upon social and medical assistance (public assistance or “welfare”). 
EU provisions exempt social and medical assistance from their scope of 
obligations. The European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance, an 
  
   
RSCAS 2001/27 © 2001 Lisa Conant 7
achievement of the Council of Europe, establishes very limited reciprocal rights 
for the nationals of all but two EU Member States. Individuals qualify for 
medical and social assistance outside their home country only by having been 
legally resident in a host state for 5 – 10 years, depending on their age. 
Continuous long term residence and close ties within a territory are the key 
markers of belonging at this checkpoint. Those Europeans who fail to meet 
these criteria face potential deportation, where their “true” home country must 
assume responsibility for their needs.15  Otherwise, EU Member States only care 
for those Europeans who demonstrate a clear entitlement to live among the 
national community. Such entitlement derives primarily from previous 
residence that was independent of social and medical assistance.   
 
Migrants challenge their exclusion from particular social welfare benefits 
by disputing distinctions between social assistance and social security in EU 
provisions. EU cooperation on social welfare measures has always been 
confined to the aggregation, coordination, and export of benefits that 
individuals become entitled to largely through their status as workers.16  Labor 
mobility could only be viable if workers were not penalized for crossing borders 
to pursue employment and returning “home” to retire. As a result, productive 
economic status gains migrants access to all potential social security benefits 
and any other “social and tax advantages” granted to national citizens within a 
Member State. Economic activity also signals the right to equal treatment for 
members of the migrant’s family, regardless of their nationality.17  Through 
participation in the market, migrants and their families become eligible for full 
integration into their host community.  
 
The ECJ’s expansive interpretation of both social security and social 
advantages has significantly broadened migrant rights to equal treatment within 
national communities. Member States’ failure to provide definitions for social 
security and social assistance in EU provisions left the ECJ free to construct its 
own categories, which typically led to the classification of borderline benefits as 
social security.18  Meanwhile, an absence of a definition for “social and tax 
advantages” led the ECJ to rule that migrants are entitled to all advantages 
“which, whether or not linked to a contract of employment, are generally 
granted to national workers primarily because of their objective economic status 
as workers or by virtue of the mere fact of their residence on the national 
territory.”19  As a result of this ECJ case law, many social welfare benefits 
intended for national citizens and residents must be provided to migrants who 
are neither citizens nor residents. No longer a mere temporary factor of 
production, currently or previously active migrants and their families command 
the support of virtually all community structures.     
 
Despite this expansive interpretation, however, the ECJ simultaneously 
recognizes a distinction between social assistance and social security that 
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respects fundamental differences in the obligations states have toward national 
citizens and migrants. According to the ECJ, social assistance encompasses 
legislation designed to provide benefits to those in need, where eligibility is 
dependent upon an element of individual assessment such as means-testing but 
not on periods of employment, affiliation, or insurance.20  Such social assistance 
falls outside the scope of EU obligations, and therefore, will not be exported to 
follow a migrant’s movement across national boundaries. Migrants’ 
qualification to receive such social assistance from a host state will also be 
dependent upon the long term residence requirements of the European 
Convention on Social and Medical Assistance. Migrants from or in Austria and 
Finland, the two EU member states that are not parties to this convention, will 
also find themselves without any entitlement to social assistance. 
 
By contrast, the ECJ categorizes as social security any "legislation which 
confers on the beneficiaries a legally defined position which involves no 
individual and discretionary assessment of need or personal circumstances."21  
Migrants can coordinate and export these benefits regardless of further cross-
national migration, and residence of any period will entitle them to such 
benefits provided by a host state. While these rulings blur distinctions between 
migrants and national citizens, they also recognize a sphere in which a national 
community may provide only for itself, i.e. the assistance available to those in 
"need," who hold no other entitlement to care. And although the ECJ rejects the 
notion that Member States can categorize their own benefits definitively,22 the 
ECJ has nonetheless refrained from challenging Member States’ efforts to 
eliminate export requirements for a set of borderline benefits likely to fall under 
the judicial definition of exportable social security. Here, the ECJ has 
recognized the legitimacy of limiting benefits that are linked to a particular 
social environment to residents of the state granting the benefit.23  For these 
benefits, which are primarily designed to provide a minimum standard of living 
for particular categories of persons such as the elderly or disabled, the marker of 
belonging is permanent resident. Those who leave the immediate community 
lose their right to such supplemental income support.  
 
EU nationals hold the widest range of entitlements to these economic and 
social rights, but third country nationals gain access in a limited range of 
circumstances, further blurring the criteria of belonging in European society. 
Being the family member of an EU national formally marks an individual as 
entitled to equal treatment as a European, but only if the EU national has 
exercised his or her European legal rights by crossing national boundaries to 
engage in economic activity in another Member State. The perverse result is 
that the third country spouses and children of EU nationals employed outside 
their home states will have more European rights than the third country family 
members of EU nationals who remain active only in their home states. The 
migrants’ family will possess the right to reside with the migrant, conditional 
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rights to remain permanently in the host state, admission to the educational 
system on the same conditions as nationals of the host state, the right to work, 
and access to all social security benefits and other social advantages.24  None of 
these derived European rights apply to the families of EU nationals who remain 
in their home countries. Here, exclusively national rules on immigation apply, 
which often exclude third country family members from access to many of these 
rights.    
 
The accretion of European rights among a set of associated third country 
nationals has been one of the most contentious developments for Member 
States. Association agreements between third countries and the EU articulate 
conditions of cooperation, with the general intention to foster economic 
exchange and development. Association agreements with Algeria, Morocco, 
Tunisia, and Turkey also include references to the nondiscriminatory treatment 
of nationals from these countries who work within the EU.25  The inflow of 
workers from these associated states was important to European economies 
from the 1960s through the mid-1970s, when most of these agreements were 
adopted. The last agreements with any of these countries that mention equal 
treatment for workers include Turkish agreements from 1980, after which 
unemployment replaced labor shortages and demand for less skilled labor 
declined. Accords with Turkey, which were designed to facilitate potential 
membership, include the most extensive provisions concerning conditions of 
employment, access to education, and residence.26  Accords with Algeria, 
Morocco, and Tunisia, which were concluded after the adoption of European 
regulations on social security coordination, include the strongest provisions 
concerning equal treatment in social security.  
 
Migrant demands to realize these provisions challenged the exclusionary 
practices of national administrations and created the opportunity for the ECJ to 
extend European rights to resident workers from these countries. In disputes 
that arose over the application of these provisions before national courts, the 
ECJ claimed the competence to interpret all of these association texts as 
European legal measures.27  By ruling that particular provisions of these 
agreements have legal effects, the ECJ created rights for Turks, Moroccans, 
Algerians, and Tunisians that are enforceable before national courts. 
 
ECJ interpretation of these association texts has simultaneously conferred 
and denied a complex variety of rights. ECJ decisions that particular provisions 
from Turkish accords were insufficiently precise or reliant upon further 
implementing measures denied Turkish nationals the right of free movement as 
workers and nondiscriminatory access to some social security benefits.28  In 
these respects, Turks remain excluded from the community of mobile 
Europeans who enjoy access to employment and portable social security across 
the EU. However, the ECJ's case law on Decisions of the Association Council 
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significantly expanded Turks' employment and education opportunities and 
granted exceptional European residence rights. On the basis of Turkish 
nationals’ participation in the labor market, the ECJ granted the right to renew 
existing work permits, switch employers, and ultimately apply for any position 
in the labor market. The ECJ also created specific rights regarding access to 
employment by the relatives and children of Turkish nationals legally working 
within the EU.29  Finally, the ECJ's linkage of the right to work with the right to 
reside created a legal right of residence for Turkish nationals. This introduction 
of a right to residence based on European law privileges Turkish nationals 
relative to all other third country nationals, who are exclusively subject to 
national measures on residence for periods longer than ninety days.30  With 
respect to residence then, Turks with a solid record of labor market participation 
belong to Europe more than any other “foreign” group.  
  
Meanwhile, the ECJ's conferral of legal effects to provisions of the 
association agreements with the Maghreb states grants nondiscriminatory access 
to social security schemes relative to host state nationals. As a result, Moroccan, 
Algerian, and Tunisian workers and their families essentially are entitled to the 
full range of social security benefits granted EU nationals under existing 
regulations.31  In one case, the ECJ granted derived rights to the spouses of this 
set of third country nationals that it had previously denied the spouses of EU 
nationals.32  To avoid the situation in which third country nationals would enjoy 
superior protection to EU nationals, the ECJ overturned its previous decision, 
granting the broader entitlement to EU nationals as well.33  In this instance, 
inclusion of a group clearly on the edge of the community led to the expansion 
of rights among those more widely accepted as Europeans.   
 
ECJ legal interpretation in this area poses the greatest challenge to 
traditional conceptions of boundaries and belonging in the EU. Association 
agreements, which Member States found expedient at one time, and whose 
application they fully intended to control, now provide the foundation for legal 
claims among individuals who are not the national citizens of any EU Member 
State. Migrants from countries conventionally considered to be outside of 
Europe are formally entitled to be treated as Europeans in important, if limited, 
spheres of life. Belonging, not unlike EU nationals, ultimately depends on 
national citizenship and economic status. Member States’ decisions to limit the 
exportability of particular social welfare benefits, and the ECJ’s acceptance of 
this, has rendered belonging dependent upon permanent residence for many 
associated third country nationals as well.     
 
The evolution of European political rights has trailed the development of 
economic and social rights and remains characterized by fundamental gaps in 
the extent to which Europeans belong to any supranational political community. 
The national citizens of Member States acquired their first “European” voting 
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rights when direct elections to the European Parliament began in 1979. The 
selection and representation of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) 
became truly supranational after the 1992 TEU granted EU nationals the right to 
vote and stand as a candidate in these elections in the Member State of 
residence, regardless of their nationality. The TEU linked this right to the 
introduction of the concept of “European citizenship.”  The other important 
political right this European citizenship confers is the right to vote and stand as 
a candidate in municipal elections where one resides. Meanwhile, the right to 
vote in national elections remains regulated by national rules that typically 
restrict this right to citizens, regardless of their residence. Member States can 
also impose minimum residence periods to qualify for voting rights in 
municipal and European Parliament elections in the event that “foreign” EU 
nationals constitute a disproportionately high (defined as 20 percent) percentage 
of the local population.34  Trust in European citizens apparently remains 
dependent on their being a small minority or long term residents. The 
supranational basis for European citizenship is also very shallow: individuals 
must be the nationals of an EU Member State to be European citizens, and this 
nationality is determined exclusively according to the national laws of each 
Member State. The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam explicitly declares that European 
citizenship complements rather than replaces national citizenship, confirming 
two layers of belonging that preserve national distinctions.  
 
Protection of more fundamental human rights in the EU has been limited 
and indirect, based primarily on the Council of Europe’s European Convention 
on Human Rights and the national constitutional traditions of the Member 
States. The ECJ has incorporated human rights principles from both of these 
sources in its case law. Member States confirmed the European Community’s 
respect for human rights in the preamble to the 1986 Single European Act 
(SEA), recognized the two traditional sources of human rights protections in the 
TEU, and extended the ECJ’s jurisdiction over these areas to EU actions in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. By the conclusion of the negotiations for the Nice Treaty, 
Member States also announced an “EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,” but 
this Charter is merely a political declaration that carries no legal force. National 
constitutions and the Council of Europe’s Convention have protected most 
Europeans’ basic human rights relative to their own national governments. But 
protection against the actions of the EU itself has been much more precarious, 
traditionally dependent on the ECJ interpreting non-EU texts on fundamental 
rights and subject to extremely restrictive standing rules. Rights to petition the 
European Parliament, and the right to contact the new European Ombudsman, 
help Europeans resolve their grievances toward EU institutions but are hardly a 
substitute for a set of legally binding rights relative to the EU. Freedom from 
the state, among the first political rights to emerge in liberal democratic states,35 
may be the last right Europeans achieve as citizens of the EU. 
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REALIZING THE SUPRANATIONAL COMMUNITY?   
DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE IDEA AND PRACTICE  
OF EUROPEAN BELONGING 
 
The idea of European rights as a set of rules that demonstrate a broader basis of 
belonging diverges from national practices that retain traditional boundaries 
between communities. Although most national governments eventually 
rescinded nationality restrictions on most public sector employment, they 
avoided making these necessary legislative changes for nearly twenty years and 
continue to evade obligations associated with EU nationals' access to public 
sector employment today. And, despite consistent reinforcement of migrants’ 
legal rights, national administrations continue to limit access to many social 
welfare benefits on the basis of territorial and national criteria. Member State 
responses reflect the extent to which national governments fail to recognize 
migrant EU nationals and associated third country nationals as members of a 
community of Europeans who deserve equal treatment.  
 
Public Servants, Public Sector Employment,  
and the Contested National Bond   
 
Member States have been reluctant to honor the implications of ECJ case law 
that granted all EU nationals access to most fields of public sector employment. 
Evasion prevailed during the decade after the ECJ issued its narrow definition 
of the public service exception to the free movement of workers in 1980. Two 
years after this initial suit against Belgium, the Belgians unsuccessfully 
defended the status of canteen staff and gardeners as public servants. To justify 
their restrictive employment practices under European law, they essentially had 
to claim that these positions, among others such as plumbers and electricians, 
somehow required the national bond or were closely connected to the exercise 
of official authority. The French apparently thought that French nurses had 
more need of the national bond than Belgian nurses, whose status as public 
servants had been denied four years before the French lost their case at the ECJ. 
The French also seemed to think that their high school teachers required more 
of a national bond than student teachers in Germany, where the ECJ had 
denounced nationality requirements six years earlier. Italians suffered from a 
similar delusion that the foreign language instructors in universities somehow 
qualified under the public service exception. Such evasion persisted after the 
European Commission issued its recommendation on this issue in 1988, 
designed to promote free movement in areas that would clearly fall outside the 
range of legitimate protection. Member States ignored the European 
Commission's guidelines, and the ECJ continued to hear a stream of disputes 
about nationality clauses in sectors it had opened to EU nationals well into the 
1990s.36 
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 As the steady trickle of migrant challenges to exclusionary practices 
persisted, the European Commission initiated a systematic program of 
prosecution. Ten Member States faced formal infringement proceedings by July 
1990. The only two Member States without apparent violations included Ireland 
and the Netherlands.37  The Member States’ response to these legal pressures 
was largely cooperative. With the exception of Luxembourg, which initially "... 
replied that it did not envisage taking any special measures of the kind 
desired,"38 all targeted Member States proposed reforms to align their official 
practices with the European definition of public service. By late 1994 Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom 
amended domestic legislation to abolish nationality conditions for at least some 
categories of public sector employment.39 French and German reforms were not 
confined to fields targeted by the European Commission, but abolished 
nationality requirements for employment across broad fields of public service.40  
Yet Germany also continued to reserve appropriate public service positions for 
German citizens alone.41  And the French opening did not eliminate all 
potentially questionable restrictions, as continuing infringements against French 
discrimination in shipping and water transport demonstrated.42  The United 
Kingdom rescinded one of its few public sector restrictions, abolishing 
nationality requirements for certain categories of researchers, to meet European 
obligations.43  Greece introduced a proposal to open public sector employment 
to EU nationals, but did not adopt it.44  The ECJ subsequently denounced 
remaining restrictions in Greece and Luxembourg, and the European 
Commission continued infringement proceedings.45  
 
Despite all this reform and prosecution, however, the European 
Commission continued to identify obvious violations in national restrictions on 
positions that have nothing to do with the exercise of official authority, such as 
tourist guides and cellists, in addition to positions already deemed open: 
language assistants, public education, university instruction, postal delivery, 
telecommunications, radio and television broadcasting, airlines, shipping, 
surface transport, urban and regional transport, civilian research, medical care, 
and the distribution of water, gas, and electricity.46  Most of these infringements 
targeted Luxembourg, which had insisted that it would not amend its 
legislation, as well as two of the usual suspects: Belgium and Greece. Yet the 
European Commission also had to use infringement proceedings to combat 
ongoing evasion in Member States that had already adopted legislative reform 
to open public sector employment to EU nationals, including France, Italy, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom.47  The ECJ consistently denounced blanket 
nationality restrictions throughout these infringement proceedings.48 Reforms in 
Belgium ultimately depended on the Belgian Conseil d’État’s (Council of State) 
declaration that European provisions on the free movement of workers were 
supreme to contrary provisions of the Belgian constitution.49 Vigilant 
prosecution has been critical to extinguish restrictions in the other two laggards 
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since Luxembourg relented only after the European Commission decided to 
pursue a daily penalty payment of 14,000 euro for continued noncompliance, 
and Greece still faces a referral for a daily penalty payment of 57,400 euro.50 
 
Migrant legal challenges and prosecution by the European Commission 
continue to identify lingering evasion. Long established and repeated ECJ 
prohibitions against discrimination in pay and working conditions for EU 
nationals employed in the public sector of a host state fail to induce changes in 
official practices.51  After opening much public sector employment to EU 
nationals, Member States began to discriminate against migrants by 
disregarding their experience in the public sector of other Member States. Cases 
in 1997 and 1998 indicate that the Dutch, Greek, and German governments 
expected that they could ignore professional experience or periods of 
employment from other Member States even though the ECJ had denounced 
such discrimination in an Italian case in 1994.52 
 
The contradictions between national governments’ long term evasion, 
eventual willingness to reform restrictive legislation, and simultaneous evasion 
regarding other forms of discrimination suggest a number of problems with 
European commitments. Resistance could potentially be attributed to a tendency 
to use public sector employment to absorb national labor during periods of high 
unemployment or to the traditional importance of fields such as education to 
national socialization. Yet, national governments did not face any real threat of 
being inundated by “foreign” applicants. Very few EU nationals have ever been 
interested in exercising their right to work outside their home state, in either the 
public or private sector. The likely pool of qualified “foreign” candidates is 
miniscule in most fields of public sector employment, which is evident from 
both the low levels of migrant employment in those states with relatively open 
public sectors and the lack of opposition to reform by public sector unions in 
states with traditionally discriminatory hiring practices.53  National governments 
simply could not be bothered with the hassle of legislative reform in order to 
help a small set of migrants, who would not even be able to register their 
gratitude with a vote in national elections. Persistent prosecution and migrant 
legal challenges, which held the potential for EU fines and financial liability in 
national courts by the early 1990s, undoubtedly changed most governments’ 
attitudes toward the burden of legislative reform.54  Keeping a few migrants out 
of public sector employment was certainly not worth recurrent legal 
recriminations, with their potential for financial penalty. As a result, national 
governments eliminated most restrictions that had been clearly established as 
violations. Meanwhile, they left other remaining discriminatory practices intact, 
waiting for serious legal pressures to emerge.  
 
Migrants, Residents, and Contested Access to Social Welfare 
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ECJ interpretation on nondiscriminatory access to social welfare benefits has 
been subject to enduring resistance by national governments. In the case of 
social and tax advantages, resistance manifests itself primarily as an evasive 
effort to exclude non-nationals from support conventionally offered to 
residents. Meanwhile, more active opposition to the export of social security 
benefits appears to privilege those individuals who remain within the state’s 
territory. These contradictory trends are united in their effort to exclude non-
nationals, who are least likely to meet the qualifying conditions attached to 
many social and tax advantages and are most likely to migrate after retirement 
or the onset of a disability.  
 
With respect to social and tax advantages, the consistent and extensive 
ECJ case law denouncing virtually all forms of discriminatory treatment faces 
quiet evasion. Similar to the stream of parallel disputes over public sector 
employment, migrants generate a series of challenges that illustrate how 
national governments ignore prior judicial prohibitions against discrimination in 
the conferral of all social and tax advantages.55  This trail of ECJ cases results 
largely from disputes over qualifying conditions, which frequently act to 
exclude non-nationals. National governments control access to benefits by 
attaching qualifying conditions without regard to the situation of migrants. 
When faced with a claim of discriminatory access, national administrations 
defend their rules in the hope that restrictions will escape censure. Yet any 
anticipation that qualifying conditions will fall outside the scope of ECJ 
interpretation on social or tax advantages is generally unjustified. Steve Peers 
observes that  
 
Indeed, it is very clear that measures are still usually classified as 'social 
advantages' by the Court even if they are only available to residents meeting 
certain conditions...  in the Court's practice, government measures will be 
classified as 'social advantages' if they are available to workers as workers, to 
residents as residents, or to specified classes of persons as specified classes of 
persons, unless the class of person in question is defined by a criteria inherently 
and inseparably related to nationality of a Member State. Since there are a 
paucity of such measures, the test … laid out in Even has been met consistently 
except for military-related benefits...56. 
 
In addition to the trail of individual challenges, the European 
Commission's 1997 report on the application of European law identified many 
overt and covert forms of national discrimination related to traditional social 
and tax advantages. The European Commission targeted potential and 
established violations in Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Much of this discrimination 
affects access to conventional advantages: access to employment for migrants' 
children, supplementary allowances for large families, early retirement schemes 
for frontier workers, study grants for workers, pension transfers, income tax, 
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non-resident taxation, and social welfare benefits and services.57  This enduring 
pattern of legal challenge is consistent with Member States' efforts to evade 
legal obligations. National administrations continue to apply discriminatory 
practices, which periodically inspire individual litigation before national courts 
or prosecution by the European Commission. However, unlike the situation 
with public sector employment, legal challenges have remained sporadic. 
Formal prosecution has been piecemeal, falling short of the systematic 
enforcement effort the European Commission engaged for public sector 
employment.  
 
With respect to social security benefits, national governments 
supplemented evasion with more active forms of resistance to avoid their 
obligations to export particular types of social security. Evasion prevailed in 
this area until the European Commission prosecuted a long-standing French 
violation, which inspired the French government to negotiate an amendment to 
the existing European regulation in order to exempt particular benefits from 
exportation. In this case, national governments legislated unanimously in the 
Council of Ministers to overrule the ECJ’s categorization of portable social 
security, creating a list of special non-contributory benefits that need not be 
exported. Meanwhile, ECJ case law on exportability contributed to the failure 
of one popular social measure and the careful design of another in Germany, 
where leaders sought to preempt ECJ interference.  
 
ECJ judgments first classified a set of non-contributory Belgian benefits 
as social security, even though the relevant allowances were supplemental 
income support that seemed similar to social assistance. The ECJ’s 
classification qualified the benefits for export, which Belgium contested as 
inappropriate. Meanwhile, the French recognized that a set of their benefits 
were analogous to the exportable Belgian benefits, but they continued to 
administer their benefits according to purely national criteria, which included 
residence and nationality conditions.58  Even when a preliminary ruling 
identified French supplemental pensions as an exportable social security benefit 
in the 1974 Biason case,59 the French authorities admitted no obligation to 
rescind restrictive national criteria. The French held that Biason, considered 
relevant only to the specific case, lacked consequences for the general 
administration of benefits. The French then sought to solidify their position in 
discussions to amend the existing European regulation.60 
 
Over a decade later, the French faced a further set of individual 
challenges related to supplemental pensions in the 1987 Giletti case.61  Once 
again, the ECJ required exportation and the French refused to reform their 
legislation or issue new orders to institutions administering the funds.62  The 
European Commission pursued infringement proceedings against France, 
challenging the refusal to export and French nationality conditions before the 
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ECJ in 1990 and 1991.63  Meanwhile, in the 1991 Stanton Newton case,64 the 
United Kingdom attempted to defend residence conditions for a mobility 
allowance whose criteria clearly fell under the ECJ's definition of social 
security. The European Commission cited the entire European case law on non-
contributory benefits of mixed type and prevailed before the ECJ.65   
 
Having definitively lost before the ECJ, national governments retaliated 
by successfully orchestrating legislative overrule. Within a year of the British 
preliminary ruling and direct ECJ condemnation of French law, the Council of 
Ministers reached unanimous agreement to amend the existing European 
regulation in order to exempt a set of special non-contributory benefits of mixed 
type from the export requirement associated with social security.66  Legislative 
overrule of the ECJ is conventionally considered to be next to impossible 
wherever unanimity is necessary because the interests of at least one Member 
State are likely to coincide with the ECJ, leading to a veto that maintains 
judicial interpretation.67  Yet, this argument assumes the existence of 
contending national interests or competition between democratic constituencies. 
The ease with which Member States reached unanimous agreement in this case 
reflects the sorry position of migrants within the EU. Migrants, who are 
effectively excluded from the national polity in their host state, cannot generate 
any counter-vailing pressure on host governments themselves. Even the loyalty 
of sending countries to their emigrant nationals is shallow: although Spanish 
consular offices provide legal representation for some of their nationals’ 
disputes in other Member States, Spain refrained from exercising its veto rights 
to help a sizeable group of migrant Spaniards in this instance. And national 
governments did not need to worry about offending any domestic constituency 
by excluding migrants from particular social security benefits. The Member 
States overturned the ECJ with secondary legislation in this instance, which did 
leave them vulnerable to judicial overrule on the basis of the treaty, which is 
considered the supreme source of European law. However, a migrant challenge 
with this precise claim failed to convince the ECJ as well. The ECJ chose to 
legitimate the linkage of particular benefits to permanent residence within the 
community granting the benefit, regardless of the discriminatory effect this 
would have on migrants.68 
 
During this process of legislative overrule, the German government refrained 
from exempting any particular German benefits from export. Since it could not 
predict the negative outcome of the anticipated treaty-based challenge to the 
revised regulation, the German administration instead structured domestic 
programs in order to preempt ECJ interference. Germany had been spared the 
need to export supplemental income schemes largely due to criteria associated 
with qualifying conditions and the administration of benefits through local and 
regional (Land) authorities. As a result, German leaders felt confident that 
existing German programs for social assistance would retain their status as 
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social assistance and avoid exportation obligations. The German government 
then took precautionary steps to ensure that proposals for two new social 
benefits, which concerned a supplemental pension scheme and long term care 
insurance, would not result in further export obligations.   
 
The German government abandoned its initiative for a supplementary 
pension scheme, the Fink Modell, despite the substantial support this program 
enjoyed from both Social and Christian Democrats. The Fink Modell was 
designed as a means to supplement the income of retirees who fell below the 
level that normally qualifies a resident for social assistance, relieving poor 
pensioners of the stigma of standard social assistance programs. German leaders 
opposed exportation of this type of benefit because they intend it as a means to 
assist individuals in coping with the cost of living in Germany,69 which was 
essentially the objection that the French, Belgians, and British had to the 
exportation of their supplemental income programs as well.70 
 
The cancellation of the Fink Modell represents a preemptive action: the 
prospect of future ECJ interference altered the course of German policymaking. 
A country that traditionally promotes a high level of social protection 
abandoned a preferred new benefit scheme in order to avoid the imposition of 
extra-territorial obligations. This reaction, a choice to restrict the expansion of 
social protection rather than be compelled to export it, reflects a frustrating 
dilemma for those committed to improving social welfare. Ostensibly 
“progressive” case law contributed to a distinct lack of progress for poor 
pensioners within Germany. It is precisely such ECJ case law that has invoked 
the ire of high level German politicians, from former Social Minister Norbert 
Blüm to former Chancellor Helmut Kohl. German leaders called for "judicial 
restraint" and assailed the ECJ for overlooking the practical and financial 
consequences of its judgments.71  Yet the resistance to export requirements 
across Member States also reflects a fundamental lack of commitment to 
provide a minimum standard of living for Europeans. The cost of living 
certainly varies across Member States and the associated countries whose 
nationals are entitled to social security, but the generosity of richer states need 
only extend to those migrants who “earned” their right to social security 
through prior contribution to the national economy. But no such magnanimity 
extends to these migrants.     
In the case of long term care insurance (Pflegeversicherung ), German 
officials hoped to preempt the exportability of benefits by categorizing program 
benefits to fall outside European export obligations. The German Care 
Insurance Law (Pflegeversicherungsgesetz) defined all of its benefits as 
“benefits in kind,” which are not subject to export obligations under European 
law. Social security programs offering benefits in kind must provide services 
for resident EU nationals as long as they have been insured against the relevant 
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risk in a social security scheme of any other Member State. By contrast, social 
security programs that offer direct “cash benefits” must export payments to 
entitled recipients, regardless of their residence. German Care insurance offers 
both direct payments to institutions providing care and “care allowances” to 
individuals who receive care from family members in their own home. Direct 
payments to institutions providing care clearly function as a benefit in kind, but 
care allowances look suspiciously similar to traditional cash benefits. By 
labeling care allowance as a benefit in kind, however, Germany avoided the 
burden of covering care for migrants who have worked and paid social security 
contributions in Germany, but live in another Member State.72 Once again, 
German policymaking responded to ECJ decisions, but the intent was to avoid 
standard European legal obligations. Rather than yielding to European 
prohibitions against territoriality and national discrimination, Germany 
structured its rules to confine benefits within national boundaries. 
 
In this case, however, migrants’ challenges to their obligation to pay 
contributions for a benefit from which they would be excluded led the ECJ to 
strike back. The ECJ ruled that German care allowances possess features similar 
to cash benefits, regardless of their classification in domestic legislation as 
benefits in kind.73 Similar to its position on European definitions of public 
service and social security, the ECJ imposed its European definition of a cash 
benefit, with all of its export obligations. As a result, individuals working in 
Germany, but living elsewhere, must pay contributions, but they also have a 
legal right to export care allowance abroad.   
 
Although Germany’s individual effort to territorialize benefits failed, the 
collective success of Member States in confining particular benefits within their 
borders, along with a broader trend to emphasize local provision of services, 
may ultimately have the unintended consequence of convincing migrants to 
remain in a host state that they would otherwise leave after retirement. The end 
costs to the government might be the same as if migrants had left the national 
community and exported their benefits. The ultimate cost of these policy 
decisions may even be greater than the costs of exportation because migrants 
choosing to remain would qualify as long term residents for social and medical 
assistance, and their demand on this assistance would only be likely to increase 
with age and distance from family members in the home state. National 
governments rely on migrants’ stronger attachment to their home countries, and 
unwillingness to remain permanently within a host community, when they 
anticipate they will save a dime with their export restrictions.    
 
Evasion may triumph in this area because the European Commission has 
not committed to any systematic effort to prosecute discriminatory practices. 
Unlike the case of public sector employment, institutional support for migrants' 
legal entitlements to social welfare benefits has not materialized. The European 
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Commission has even cautioned against expansions in statutory social benefits, 
arguing that the costs of social protection schemes can have a negative effect on 
employment and growth.74  National governments, meanwhile, show no signs of 
a growing European commitment to greater social equality. Member States have 
demonstrated their intention of maintaining firm control over social security 
coordination by continuing to require unanimity, despite the broad expansion of 
qualified majority voting since the SEA in 1986.75  Interests in social security 
cooperation were always linked tightly to the interest in promoting labor 
mobility. With the recent and exclusive exception of highly skilled labor, any 
interest in labor mobility diminished shortly after Member States laid solid 
foundations for equal treatment in European provisions due to the shock of the 
oil crisis and the recession and unemployment that followed. Economic decline 
and restructuring during the 1980s increased unemployment and contributed to 
large-scale redundancies among migrant workers in particular. Recent 
discussions about the potential need for an active labor immigration policy in 
both national and EU contexts narrowly focus attention on the emerging 
information economy’s demand for highly skilled technical workers and the 
lack of home-grown talent.76  Once again, economic status appears as the core 
marker of belonging for those outside traditional national communities.  
 
Third Country Families, Associated Nationals,  
and Contested European Membership  
 
Perhaps the clearest manifestation of the contested nature of European 
belonging is evident in conflicts over the place of non-EU nationals in 
European society. Discriminatory practices toward migrant EU nationals, 
although endemic with respect to public sector employment and social welfare 
benefits, pale in comparison to the exclusion that third country nationals 
experience within the EU. The European legal rights enjoyed by third country 
nationals encounter the most pervasive and intense official resistance. Yet, these 
peripheral migrants find allies, not only in the ECJ, but also in national courts 
and domestic organizations committed to the individual rights of everyone 
resident in their communities. It is in the treatment of third country nationals 
that struggles within the state appear most contradictory, and membership in 
European society most confused. In addition to flagrant evasion, conflict over 
third country nationals’ European rights generates bizarre paradoxes. National 
governments find themselves forced to treat the third country family members 
of EU migrants better than the third country family members of their own 
national citizens. Meanwhile, the nationals of associated states with no likely 
prospect of EU membership, such as Algeria and Morocco, have more European 
entitlements than the nationals of more recently associated states that are slated 
to enter the EU within this decade, such as Poland and Hungary.      
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Realizing the European rights of migrant EU nationals’ families remains 
among the most persistent problem areas, particularly if dependants are third 
country nationals. Although migrants' families enjoy rights to equal treatment 
regardless of their nationality, national administrations frequently treat these 
individuals as if they were simply foreigners without any special legal rights.77  
Of course, these individuals could be treated as “regular” foreigners if they were 
merely related to the host state’s own citizens. The 1986 Gül case78 exposes 
both a clear violation of a basic right under European law and the contradictory 
position of third country family members in European society. German 
authorities tried to restrict a Cypriot physician, Gül, from obtaining a regular 
permit to practice medicine in Germany. Married to a British national working 
in Germany, Gül had received a temporary permit to practice medicine while 
training as an anesthesiologist in Germany. European law explicitly provides 
spouses of employed EU migrants with access to employment, and does not 
exclude them from particular professions. Spouses of migrant workers must 
simply demonstrate that they have the appropriate qualifications. Since Gül 
completed a German anesthesiology residency, he satisfied these requirements. 
Nonetheless, German officials claimed that European law did not provide the 
right to work in a particular profession such as medicine, insisted that non-EU 
nationals only receive temporary permits, and argued that renewal was not 
desirable because many German physicians were unemployed. The German 
observations even attempted to connect restrictions on the freedom of 
movement due to public health grounds to the public health sector, even though 
these exceptions are clearly designed to restrict the movement of diseased 
individuals rather than the movement of physicians. The Germans lost the case 
on all grounds.79  Yet, had Gül been married to a German citizen who had 
always worked in Germany, the German government would have been legally 
justified in its restriction.  
 
Member States have also responded to ECJ case law on the legal rights of 
associated third country nationals with evasion and preemptive acts that have 
produced a similar paradox. National governments contest the very principle 
that association agreements are part of the European legal order that confers 
enforceable rights.80  As a result, national administrations make the most 
strenuous efforts to evade these migrants’ legal claims. In response to 
challenges, national governments have complied with individual decisions and 
avoided reforms to accommodate the rights of associated third country 
nationals. Furthermore, the Member States acted unanimously to preempt future 
judicial expansion of individual rights by eliminating measures for the equal 
treatment of migrants in all new association agreements.  
 
With respect to evasion, Germany distributed ECJ case law granting 
residence and employment rights to Turkish nationals to competent authorities 
with instructions to interpret the legal decisions as restrictively as possible. 
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Authorities should only respond favorably to instances with virtually identical 
factual conditions, which results in the need to bring new legal challenges for 
broadly parallel situations.81  As a result, national courts have been busy 
resolving over 200 disputes related to these rights.82  The French response to 
ECJ decisions that grant equal treatment in social security to associated third 
county nationals from Morocco and Algeria was almost identical to its handling 
of the export of supplemental income benefits for EU nationals. French 
authorities first ignored the implications of the ECJ’s 1991 Kziber ruling,83 
which originated from a Belgian court. The French continued to refuse to 
rescind their general exclusion of associated third country nationals after an 
Algerian national successfully appealed for a supplemental income benefit from 
the French Cour de Cassation in 1991, who ruled according to the ECJ’s Kziber 
decision without making any reference to it. French authorities treated these 
judgments as individual cases that lacked consequences for administrative 
practices writ large.84  The French administration continued to resist reforms 
after a French court received a preliminary ruling on the case of an Algerian 
national in 1995.85  French authorities ordered the offices distributing 
supplemental income benefits to provide benefits only to those individuals who 
initiated proceedings in French courts.86   
 
Such evasion is formally legitimate under European law because ECJ 
decisions officially apply only to the parties addressed by specific rulings. 
However, what is striking about this instance of evasion is that France was also 
defying its own constitutional court. Different agents of state power are acting 
against each other here. In January of 1990 the Conseil Constitutionnel had 
declared the denial of supplemental income schemes to nationals who have no 
special bilateral social security rights to be unconstitutional. This decision 
affects all foreigners in France, not just associated third country nationals.87  In 
response to what they saw as an egregious breach of the law, organizations that 
assist migrants helped bring over eighty-nine cases for associated third country 
nationals before French courts. At least fifty-nine of these decisions accorded 
benefits, while fourteen rejected the applications.88  Meanwhile, the French 
administration remained content to consider specific cases as they proceeded 
through courts, awarding benefits under particular judicial orders for individual 
applicants.89  In response to criticisms of this practice, French officials observed 
that the extension of social security rights to associated third country nationals 
would have strong, damaging implications for public finances.90  But, the 
French state acted against itself yet again, when the Conseil d’État, which is 
essentially an extension of the national administration itself as the supreme 
administrative court, denounced such administrative practice as an abuse of 
power and annulled the relevant administrative orders.91  
 
In addition to this evasion, Member States collectively preempted ECJ 
intervention in this area for all new association agreements with third countries. 
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Most notably, the Member States eliminated migrant rights in association 
agreements with central and eastern European countries, including those 
scheduled for eminent EU membership. Member States refrained from including 
provisions for the equal treatment of migrant workers from prospective EU 
Members such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, 
Romania, and Slovenia.92  The Member States even revoked nondiscrimination 
measures from a cooperation accord with Yugoslavia in 1991.93  These actions 
are the national governments’ collective response to the ECJ's interpretation of 
accords with Turkey, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.94  The Member States 
have certainly made their distaste for the ECJ decisions clear. They have also 
rendered the citizens of east and central Europe less European than the citizens 
of states many would classify in the Middle East. Of the four states with 
association agreements conferring migrant rights, only Turkey is a potential 
future member of the EU. And Turkey is virtually guaranteed to be granted 
membership later than countries in central Europe. Such preemption is hardly a 
warm welcome to prospective EU nationals.   
 
The European Commission has not extended much of a welcome to 
associated third country nationals either. Instead of advocating that the ECJ 
confer legal effects on social security measures in the accords with Morocco, 
Algeria, and Tunisia, it argued for the necessity of further (intergovernmental) 
measures of the Association Council.95 And, despite rampant evasion of 
consistent ECJ legal interpretation, the European Commission has only 
bothered to prosecute one likely infringement in this field, a case against France 
regarding social security benefits for Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians.96 
Yet, the European Commission did make one constructive proposal related to 
all third country nationals’ rights within the EU: it suggested the rather 
minimalist humanitarian idea of extending social security benefits to cover 
urgent medical care for insured third country nationals who are briefly visiting a 
second Member State. Even this the Member States rejected.97  Apparently, 
national governments would rather let third country nationals drop dead abroad 
than concede that social security coordination for third country nationals is 
covered under legally enforceable European provisions.98 
 
In summary, Member States have responded to the ECJ's efforts to 
abolish national discrimination among Europeans with considerable resistance. 
National governments persistently attempt to evade the broad application of 
European legal rights to migrants within the EU. When pressed to bring 
practices into line with ECJ interpretation, Member States have reacted by 
adopting measures to overturn or preempt unwelcome migrant rights. These 
negative responses are consistent with patterns of interest to the extent that 
many legal entitlements entail financial costs while benefiting individuals who 
cannot even contribute to the re-election of national governments. Yet 
resistance also reflects the importance of traditional conceptions of identity, 
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independent of overt economic or political interests, because 1) national 
governments long evaded and continue to evade virtually costless rights 
associated with public sector employment, and 2) they resist benefits for 
associated third country nationals to a much greater extent than benefits for EU 
migrants, despite parallel costs associated with rights for each population. As 
the European Court of Justice attempts to blur national boundaries by creating 
transnational European rights and obligations, Member States actively maintain 
and reconstruct territorial and national borders through their law, policy, and 
practice. 
 
NO STAKE IN EUROPE? INDIVIDUALS AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
BETWEEN NATIONALIZED AND UNIVERSAL COMMUNITIES   
  
The EU has the potential to create a European foundation of belonging for a 
population of approximately 300 million EU nationals. Yet, individuals have 
not been very responsive to their European entitlements throughout the history 
of integration. Only a tiny minority of EU nationals has ever exercised the free 
movement rights that provide them equal access to opportunities available in 
other Member States. According to the most recent census figures, only 4.9 
million EU nationals live in a Member State other than the country whose 
nationality they possess, and only two million of these migrants are employed.99  
With the exception of substantial Italian migration in the early days of European 
integration, most intra-EU migration flows are limited to border regions.100  
Expectations of large scale migration from other southern Member States were 
never realized. This is partly due to delayed implementation of the free 
movement rights of workers from poorer new member countries such as 
Portugal and Spain. Free movement of goods, whether intentional or not, then 
tends to substitute for migration within the EU. Meanwhile, migration from 
non-member countries generally has outpaced migration of EU nationals.101  
The population of associated third country nationals who possess explicit 
European legal rights, at 4.15 million, alone almost matches the population of 
migrant EU nationals. This group of non-EU nationals includes residents of 
Turkish (2,300,000), Moroccan (1,000,000), Algerian (600,000), and Tunisian 
(250,000) nationality.102  Combined, the two populations of migrants who 
legally belong to Europe total approximately nine million, which constitutes 
slightly less than 3 percent of the entire population base within the European 
Union.  
 
This migrant population, to the extent it is organized at all, is 
overwhelming organized in the form of associations representing single ethnic 
groups. Associations of migrants of the same national origin organize cultural 
and social activities and provide assistance to each other primarily in the form 
of general information about housing, employment, and vocational training 
within local communities.103 Very few associations have a genuinely 
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transnational membership. Exceptional cases include the European Union 
Migrants Forum and Euro-Citizen Action Service. Moreover, of the tiny 
minority of associations that provide legal assistance to migrants, virtually all 
provide this assistance without regard to the migrant’s national origin. EU 
nationals do not hold a privileged position, except with the Euro-Citizen Action 
Service and the recently launched Free Movement Solidarity Fund. Otherwise, 
those who provide legal counsel to migrants deal predominantly with asylum, 
human rights, third country immigrants, and racism.104  The small numbers of 
lawyers and associations that bother to help migrants overcome exclusion 
appear to be committed to the equal treatment of all individuals within their 
communities. Most attempt to enforce universal rights, rather than the particular 
rights of those with European credentials.   
 
The resource constraints these associations face suggest that mobilizing 
civil society behind the equal treatment of migrants is difficult. Few 
organizations possess the resources to deploy litigation at all. Groups that have 
supported litigation to help migrants in the EU include the Immigration Law 
Practitioners' Association (ILPA) of London and Groupe d'Information et de 
Soutien des Travailleurs Immigrès (GISTI) in France. The Spanish Consulates 
have supported some litigation on behalf of migrant Spanish nationals as well. 
Litigation is usually very challenging for non-governmental organizations to 
carry out. GISTI relies overwhelmingly on volunteers and has limited resources 
to pursue litigation. Simply finding lawyers with sufficient expertise in 
European employment and social security rights constitutes a major problem.105  
The financial base of the new Free Movement Solidarity could be wiped out in a 
single case if appeals through one of the more expensive national legal systems 
were involved.106  The paucity of organizational resources reflects the 
traditionally marginal position of migrants: migrant labor is concentrated in 
basic manufacturing in Germany; the traded services industry, construction, and 
public works in France; and basic services, excluding public administration, in 
the United Kingdom.107  Meanwhile, most labor organizations and civic groups 
that represent individual interests focus on national communities and have not 
yet engaged transnational or migrant issues seriously. In this respect, civil 
society in Member States remains overwhelmingly nationalized.  
 
Employers are a potential champion of migrant rights since 
nondiscrimination measures expand the potential pool of qualified candidates. 
However, European employers in both the public and private sectors have 
remained relatively uninterested in promoting the free movement of workers. 
Serious interest in greater labor mobility has a very narrow focus on highly 
qualified labor.108  This does not generate much political pressure for reform 
because highly qualified workers and their employers can generally be easily 
accommodated through piecemeal exceptions to existing practices. Demand for 
lower skilled labor, where most migrant male labor has been concentrated, has 
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been declining in Europe over the past two decades. Decline and restructuring 
in manufacturing and mining sectors, as well as volatility in the construction 
sector, has contributed to increasing unemployment among migrant male 
workers. Laid-off migrant workers, who are generally older and experienced 
only in manual and unskilled jobs, have little hope of finding employment. The 
better qualifications of a second generation of “migrant” workers manifests 
itself in the increasing employment of foreigners across most sectors of the 
economy, including those once dominated by nationals. However, these young 
“migrants” still are unemployed at higher rates than young nationals, partially 
due to discrepancies in educational attainment between the children of migrant 
workers and nationals.109    
These trends in the labor market coincided with increasing migration 
within and into Europe. Increasing migration among EU nationals from 1988-
1990 was followed by increasing migration of third country nationals into the 
European Union. The number of third country nationals increased suddenly, 
growing by more than 1.5 million people from 1990-1992. During this period 
Germany admitted eight times more foreigners, both EU citizens (160,000) and 
non-EU nationals (800,000) than other Member States. Nationals of central and 
eastern Europe account for twenty-five percent of this increase (over 200,000 
people).110   
 
With continuing high unemployment levels in Europe, the plight of new 
migrants attracted little sympathy. Member States have largely responded to the 
upsurge in migration with a policy of closure toward third country nationals. 
Although current EU nationals are not directly affected by these restrictive 
policies, reforms reflect official orientation toward migrants, in many cases 
migrants who are citizens of central and east European states who will be EU 
nationals in the near future. During the 1990s all EU Member States, with the 
exception of Denmark and Sweden, legislated major changes in their domestic 
migration regimes. Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Spain tightened 
regulations concerning the entry and residence of foreigners. Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain created new measures to identify and reduce 
illegal migration and employment. German investigation of suspected illegal 
employment and abuse of unemployment benefits among foreigners intensified 
from the early 1990s.111  Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom 
adopted more restrictive asylum procedures. In the German case, asylum reform 
required constitutional amendment. All of these legislative reforms expedite the 
identification of fraudulent claims, illegal residence, and underground 
employment, and they strengthen measures to deport foreign offenders.112  The 
practical effect of these measures has been substantial: German recognition 
rates for asylum applications fell from a high of 29% in 1985 to approximately 
3% by 1992.113   
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At the EU level, intergovernmental cooperation focuses overwhelmingly 
on security issues that frame the need for a common migration policy in terms 
of criminality. As a result, evolving EU provisions, many of which escape 
review by national and European legal institutions, concentrate on means of 
policing and control.114  The recent electoral success of Jörg Haider’s Freedom 
Party in Austria is the darkest manifestation of anti-foreigner sentiment in 
Europe. Although other EU Member States denounced the inclusion of Haider’s 
party in the Austrian government, the widespread increase in domestic 
restrictions on migration, and preliminary EU efforts to exclude third country 
nationals more effectively, reflect an official effort to restrict membership in 
European society. 
   
In conclusion, neither states nor societies within the EU are responding 
enthusiastically to the opportunity to construct a genuinely European foundation 
for belonging. The exclusion of many migrants from their legal entitlement to 
equal treatment reflects a significant discrepancy between what ECJ justices 
and national officials consider to be appropriate practice. The ECJ created rights 
that national governments never intended to honor, and reactions of evasion, 
overrule, and preemption prevail as a result. Moreover, even the ECJ and 
European Commission refrain from challenging core forms of national 
belonging. Meanwhile, few individuals seize the opportunity to transgress 
traditional boundaries and integrate themselves within a transnational 
community of Europeans. Even fewer bother to work with others to achieve 
their common rights as Europeans. The supranational European society is 
elusive and will remain so until someone cares to build it.     
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